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T

he past two decades have brought revolutionary changes in
global health, driven by popular concern over the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), new strains of influenza, and maternal mortality.1
International development assistance for health — a crucial aspect of health cooperation — increased by a factor of five, from $5.6 billion in 1990 to $28.1 billion in
2012, with the private and voluntary sectors taking on an ever-increasing share of
the total.2 Given the rapid globalization that is a defining feature of today’s world,
the need for a robust system of global health law has never been greater.
Global health law is not an organized legal system, with a unified treatymonitoring body, such as the World Trade Organization. However, there is a network of treaties and so-called “soft” law instruments that powerfully affect global
health, many of which have arisen under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO). Global health law has been defined as the legal norms, processes, and institutions that are designed primarily to attain the highest possible
standard of physical and mental health for the world’s population.3
Global health law can affect multiple spheres, ranging from national security,
economic prosperity, and sustainable development to human rights and social
justice. Each global health problem is shaped by the language of rights, duties, and
rules for engagement used in the law (see Glossary).

Under s ta nding the L aw a nd Gl ob a l He a lth

An interactive
timeline
is available
at NEJM.org
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Safeguarding the population’s health traditionally occurs at the national level, with
a web of laws and regulations governing health services, injury and disease prevention, and health promotion.4 However, in a globalized world in which pathogens
and lifestyle risks span borders, the need for collective action has intensified interest in international legal solutions.5
The law relating to global health rests primarily within the domain of public
international law, which can be broadly characterized as the rules that govern the
conduct and relations of countries, including their rights and obligations. Countries remain the major subjects of international law, but international organizations and (through human rights law) individuals are also considered to be subjects of international law.
There is a complex array of international norms, including those that are binding, or “hard” (e.g., treaties), and those that are nonbinding, or “soft” (e.g., codes
of practice). Hard and soft legal instruments have many similarities and often take
similar forms, since both forms of instruments are negotiated and adopted by
countries, are administered by international organizations, and have similar compliance mechanisms, such as setting targets, monitoring progress, and reporting
to governmental agencies. Soft instruments can influence domestic law and policy
and are often viewed as part of the corpus of international law (Fig. 1; and the
interactive timeline, available at NEJM.org).6
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Glossary
International Law
Treaty: A binding agreement between countries that is intended to create legal rights and duties. Treaties can often
have substantial effects on private parties, such as corporations (e.g., trade law) and individuals (e.g., human rights).
Customary international law: Legal norms established by consistent practice among countries.
WHO Treaty-Making Powers
Convention: An international agreement under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, which empowers the World
Health Assembly to “adopt conventions or agreements” by a two-thirds vote on “any matter within the competence of the Organization.” The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (adopted in 2003) is the Assembly’s
only convention.
Regulation: An international rule under Article 21, which empowers the World Health Assembly to adopt regulations
on a range of health topics. The two Assembly regulations are the Nomenclature with Respect to Diseases and
Causes of Death (adopted in 1948) and the International Health Regulations (revised in 2005).
WHO “Soft” Law
“Soft” law: An instrument that creates health norms without the binding nature of international law. Article 23 empowers the WHO to issue formal recommendations, but the organization has developed norms through a range
of soft instruments, such as global strategies, action plans, and guidelines.
Recommendations: Norms under Article 23, which empowers the World Health Assembly “to make recommendations to members.” Two Assembly recommendations are the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk
Substitutes (adopted in 1981) and the Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health
Personnel (adopted in 2010).
Global strategies: Proposals that offer a strategic vision of how to tackle health challenges, listing specific objectives
and guidance to stakeholders — for example, the WHO Global Health Sector Strategy for HIV/AIDS, 2011–2015.
Global strategies often stress the comparative advantages of the WHO, such as its ability to leverage its strengths
through partnerships and coordination.
Global action plans: Proposals that outline specific steps or activities for a strategy to succeed — for example, the Global
Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, 2013–2020. Global plans often specify
detailed tasks, time horizons, and resources.
Guidelines: Policies or methods of professional practice that are approved by the Guidelines Review Committee
and designed to promote evidence-based health policies or clinical interventions — for example, guidelines on
patient safety.
International Human Rights Law
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: An agreement that requires governments to safeguard civil and
political rights, including the freedom of expression and religion, freedom from slavery and torture, and rights
to privacy.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: An agreement that guarantees “the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” as well as capturing social
determinants: “an adequate standard of living . . . including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions.”
General Comment 14: The interpretation of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of the right to health,
including health goods, services, and facilities that should be available, accessible, acceptable, and of good quality.

In recent years, the international community
has moved toward a new language of global
governance.7 Neither global health law nor governance is well defined, but the central feature
of global health law is the negotiation, adoption,
and monitoring of normative rules among countries. Both law and broader governance require
institutions to do much of the work, including
creating norms, mobilizing resources, guiding
multiple stakeholders to work collaboratively, and
ensuring accountability for results. The WHO is
the most important institution for negotiating
international health agreements.8
n engl j med 370;18

W HO a s a Nor m at i v e Agenc y
The WHO has constitutional authority to negotiate and monitor normative instruments — both
treaties and soft instruments, such as recommendations. The constitution of the WHO enunciates the universal value of the right to health
— a widely adopted international legal entitlement.9,10
The WHO uses a variety of policy tools to set
soft norms, with varying levels of institutional
support. A World Health Assembly resolution
expresses the will of 194 member countries. The
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agency has constitutional authority to adopt formal recommendations; the two most prominent
are the International Code of Marketing of
Breast-Milk Substitutes (adopted in 1981)11 and
the Global Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Personnel (adopted in
2010).12 The Assembly has also adopted influential global strategies and action plans.
The treaty-making powers of the WHO are
extraordinary, with separate processes for negotiating agreements, or conventions, and regulations. Member countries must accept or reject a
convention within 18 months after its adoption
by the Assembly.10 This is a powerful mechanism requiring countries to consider the treaty
in accordance with national constitutional processes. The WHO, however, lacks the authority
to enforce compliance and thus relies on governmental implementation through domestic law
and policy.
The WHO can negotiate regulations on a
range of health topics, including sanitation and
quarantine, nomenclatures of diseases, and standards for the safety, purity, and potency of pharmaceuticals. Regulations enter into force after

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

The WHO did not negotiate a convention until
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

1978
Adoption of the Declaration of Alma-Ata
(“Health for All”) by the International
Conference on Primary Health Care

1893
Adoption of the International List of
Causes of Death (predecessor to the
International Classification of Diseases)

1900s

1910s

m e dic i n e

adoption by the Assembly, except for members
that notify the director-general within a specified time.10 Consequently, countries must proactively opt out or they are automatically bound.
The first WHO regulations — on nomenclature
for diseases — date back to the late 19th century as the International List of Causes of Death;
these regulations are now implemented through
the International Classification of Diseases.13
The second WHO regulations date back to 1892,
when European countries adopted the International Sanitary Convention, a predecessor to the
International Sanitary Regulations (now called
the International Health Regulations).3
The constitution of the WHO creates ongoing
governmental obligations to report annually on
actions taken on recommendations, conventions,
and regulations.10 Despite the normative powers
of the WHO, modern international health law is
remarkably thin, with only two major treaties
adopted since the creation of the agency.

1892
Adoption of the International Sanitary
Convention (predecessor to the
International Health Regulations)

1890s

of

1981
Adoption of the
International Code of
Marketing of Breast-Milk
Substitutes

1948
Adoption of Nomenclature
with Respect to Diseases
and Causes of Death

1920s

1930s

1940s

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

1988
Launch of the global
program to eradicate polio

1951
Adoption of the International Sanitary
Regulations (predecessor to the
International Health Regulations)
1955
Launch of the global program to
eradicate malaria

1999
Launch of Vision 2020, a global
initiative to eliminate avoidable
blindness by the year 2020

1959
Launch of the global program to
eradicate smallpox
Historical predecessors to contemporary WHO instruments

WHO Global Campaigns cosponsored with partners

WHO treaties: Conventions or Regulations

WHO Nonbinding Normative Instruments

U.N. Nonbinding Resolutions and Declarations

Figure 1. Timeline of Major Milestones in Global Health Law.
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(FCTC), which was adopted in 2003.14 The FCTC,
which remains the only convention adopted by
the World Health Assembly, was ratified by 177
countries that are home to 88% of the world’s
population, although the convention was not
ratified by 2 countries, the United States and Indonesia, which have the third and fourth largest
populations, respectively, worldwide.15 In 2012,
the Secretariat of the FCTC estimated that nearly
80% of the 159 countries that submitted reports
had strengthened national tobacco-control laws
after ratification.16 However, overall progress
masks unequal performance — for example,
China showed “an alarming lack of progress,”
whereas India’s implementation was “slow.”16
The FCTC created binding norms to reduce
the demand for, and supply of, tobacco products
and to share information and resources. Efforts
to reduce demand include taxing and pricing
guided by health objectives, the provision of
100% smoke-free environments, disclosures of
contents and emissions of tobacco products,
large warning labels on packaging of tobacco
products, comprehensive marketing bans, and
tobacco cessation and treatment programs. Re-

2000
Adoption of the Millennium
Declaration and Millennium
Development Goals

ducing the supply of tobacco focuses on illicit
trade (e.g., smuggling and counterfeiting), which
was estimated to account for 11.6% of global
cigarette consumption in 2009, resulting in lost
tax revenues of $30 to $50 billion per year.17
Despite the success of the FCTC in mobilizing governmental action and civil-society engagement, the treaty has major weaknesses. First, it
contains ambiguous language, affording countries broad discretion in implementation. Second,
it does not provide resources to give low- and
middle-income countries sufficient capacity to
implement and enforce policies outlined in the
convention. In addition, the tobacco industry has
fought back against the FCTC, bringing cases
under the World Trade Organization and investment treaties against Australia and Uruguay for
their use of plain packaging of tobacco products
and adoption of tobacco-control legislation — a
classic conflict between health and commerce
regimes.18,19
International Health Regulations

The World Health Assembly adopted a substantially revised version of the International Health

2011
Launch of the Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework
2011
• Adoption of the Political Declaration
on the Prevention and Control of
Noncommunicable Diseases
• Adoption of the Political Declaration
on HIV/AIDS (10-yr follow-up)

2006
Adoption of the Political
Declaration on HIV/AIDS
(5-yr follow-up)

2001
Publication of the Global
Strategy for Containment of
Antimicrobial Resistance
2001
Adoption of the Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS

2006
Launch of the Stop TB Strategy

2013
Launch of the Mental Health Action Plan

2000s

2010s
2014
Adoption of the Sustainable
Development Goals

2005
Adoption of the Revised
International Health
Regulations

2012
Adoption of a resolution promoting
universal health coverage worldwide

2004
Adoption of the Global Strategy on
Diet, Physical Activity, and Health
2003
Adoption of the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control
2003
Launch of the 3 by 5 Initiative (HIV
treatment for 3 million patients by 2005)

2010
• Adoption of the Global Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Personnel
• Adoption of the Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol
2009
Adoption of the Global Action Plan for the Prevention
and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases
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Regulations in 2005 in the aftermath of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak,
establishing a framework for global health security.20 The aim of the regulations is to enhance
the monitoring and reporting of international
health threats and to improve the coordination
of the response while avoiding unnecessary interference with traffic and trade.21 The regulations govern surveillance and containment of
disease within countries, at borders, and in international travel.22
The regulations encompass a broad spectrum of health hazards of international concern, regardless of their origin or source — biologic, chemical, or radionuclear. Using a decision
instrument as a guide, governments must monitor health hazards and notify the WHO within
24 hours after events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.
The director-general has the exclusive power to
declare an emergency and has done so only once
— during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.
The regulations permit the WHO to take into account unofficial sources, such as nongovernmental organizations, scientists, and social networks
in print and electronic media. Countries also
agreed to develop core capacities — including
legislation, national focal points, and pandemic
planning — to implement the regulations.
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)
Framework

Although not a treaty, the WHO PIP Framework
is an innovative hybrid — a soft law instrument
that nonetheless can create binding obligations.
Adopted in May 2011, the PIP Framework resolved the nearly 5-year controversy that erupted
when Indonesia refused to share samples of influenza A (H5N1) virus with WHO collaborating
centers. Claiming sovereignty over a virus that
was identified in their territory, Indonesian officials expressed concern that their country would
not receive a fair share of the benefits of scientific discoveries.23,24
The PIP Framework facilitates sharing of influenza viruses that have human pandemic potential and increases access to vaccines and antiviral medications in developing countries. The
agreement incorporates “standard material transfer agreements” between the WHO and biotechnology companies or universities. When such
agreements are signed, they create contractual
duties to provide certain benefits in exchange
1736
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for access to biologic materials. Recipients of
such materials make monetary and in-kind commitments, including commitments to donate vaccines to WHO stockpiles, offer products at affordable prices, and make intellectual-property
rights available. Sharing the benefits of scientific progress is a vital aspect of global security
and justice. However, the intellectual-property
controversy associated with the novel corona
virus that causes the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) reminds the international community that the PIP Framework applies only to
pandemic influenza, with no WHO-negotiated
agreement covering other emerging diseases.25

In ter nat iona l Hum a n
R igh t s L aw
The constitution of the WHO proclaims, “The
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health is one of the fundamental rights of every
human being.”10 Reflecting the same sentiment,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, which complements the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and which 161 countries have accepted as binding international law, guarantees “the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” It
also spells out governmental obligations to reduce infant mortality, promote the development
of healthy children, improve environmental and
industrial hygiene, prevent and treat diseases,
and ensure the provision of medical services.26 In
a demonstration of the universal value of such
provisions, all countries except South Sudan have
joined at least one treaty recognizing the right to
health.27
The right to health requires that governments
meet “minimum core obligations,” including the
provision of health facilities, goods, and services,
without discrimination and distributed equitably; nutritious and safe food; shelter, housing,
sanitation, and safe and potable water; and essential medicines. Health goods, services, and
facilities must be available in sufficient quantity,
with public accessibility, ethnic and cultural acceptability, and good quality, as outlined in
General Comment 14 of the U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.28
Whether human rights law influences governmental practices is disputed.29 However, health
rights are incorporated into statutes and constinejm.org
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tutions in many countries and have formed the
basis for landmark judicial rulings.3 The realworld effect of human rights law depends on an
active civil society, which can highlight governmental violations, lobby parliaments, and litigate
health rights.30 The most successful national
litigation has involved access to essential medicines. For example, in 2002, the Constitutional
Court in South Africa struck down government
limits on access to nevirapine for pregnant
women with human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) infection. As a result of this ruling, the
government had to begin to realize the rights of
mothers and infants to HIV prevention.31
Judicial decisions are increasing access to
underlying determinants of health, such as food,
water, and housing. In 2001, the Indian Supreme
Court held that nutrition programs were legal
entitlements and required that cooked meals be
provided for primary school children. In later
orders, the court set timetables for action on
subsidized grain, maternal and child health,
and food for the homeless and rural poor.3
Table 1 shows country-level court cases that illustrate the effect of human rights law on health
policy.

Ch a l l enge s in Gl ob a l
He a lth L aw
Despite the potential of soft and hard instruments
to set norms and mobilize multiple actors, global
health laws have major limitations (Table 2).
First, governments are loath to constrain themselves and, therefore, often reject international
law or agree only to weak norms. Second, highincome countries are reluctant to finance capacity building in lower-income countries or to provide funding to the WHO without specific
earmarks. And third, compliance mechanisms
for such laws are often weak or nonexistent.
Because international law primarily addresses
the rights and duties of countries, it cannot easily govern nonstate actors, which range from individuals and civil-society groups to foundations
and private enterprises. Although newer global
health institutions (e.g., UNAIDS, Global Fund,
and GAVI Alliance) include civil-society representatives on their governing boards, the WHO
has resisted nonstate participation in its governing structures.32
The harmonization of governmental interests,
moreover, can be difficult because of the dispan engl j med 370;18

rate perspectives.33 Although high-income countries often favor trade liberalization, low- and
middle-income countries seek greater access to
drugs and the fruits of technological progress.
In 2001, World Trade Organization members
adopted the Doha Declaration on TRIPS (the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) and Public Health, which
allowed countries to issue a compulsory license
during a public health emergency, granting to
itself or a third party the right to produce or
import a patented drug without authorization
from the patent holder.34 So-called “TRIPS flexibilities” were designed to ensure that intellectual property should not prevent countries from
providing affordable access to essential medications in a public health emergency.
Increasingly, the reconciliation of these interests occurs at the national level. For example, in
2013, the Supreme Court of India held that Novartis did not have a valid patent in India on the
lucrative cancer drug Gleevec.35 The court ruled
that Indian law grants patents only to new compounds and that modified drugs must improve
treatment for patients. The decision could embolden other emerging economies to reject similar intellectual-property claims. At the same
time, developed countries are seeking stricter
intellectual-property protection in trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
which seeks to promote trade and investment
among the partner countries.36
Trust in international organizations to act impartially and demonstrate leadership is crucial
to the future of global health law. As new health
security challenges arise, the integrity and efficient functioning of the WHO becomes ever more
important. The WHO, however, is struggling with
a small group of donors that contribute approximately 80% of its total budget.37 The term for this
type of financing is “multi-bi” aid — donors’
earmarking of noncore funding for specific sectors, diseases, or regions through multilateral
agencies.38 Since the leadership of the WHO is
unable to control most of its budget, these aid
arrangements endanger the perceived independence and normative influence of the WHO.
Financing is intricately related to the challenge
of building capacity to fulfill duties created by
global health law. The 2011 review committee
on the functioning of the International Health
Regulations stressed that many countries lacked
capacity and were not on a path to fulfill their
nejm.org
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Table 1. Human Rights Court Cases Showing the Influence of International Law on Domestic Health Policy.
Case

Year

Country

Cruz del Valle Bermúdez v.
Ministerio de Sanidad
y Asistencia Social

1999

Venezuela

Basis for Decision

Court Decision

People’s Union for Civil Liberties
v. Union of India

2001

India

Rights to health, food, and life

Requires free and universal nutrition programs (midday meal), setting standards and timetables for action

Minister of Health v. Treatment
Action Campaign

2002

South Africa

Right to health

Strikes down government limits on access
to nevirapine for pregnant women

A.V. et al. v. Estado Nacional

2004

Argentina

Roa Lopez v. Colombia

2006

Colombia

Rights to life and health

Finds unconstitutional a prohibition on
abortions to protect the life or health
of the mother or in cases of rape, even
when the fetus is not viable

Judgment T-760/08

2008

Colombia

Right to health

Requires the government to unify two insurance plans with fewer benefits for
indigent persons into a single plan
with equal benefits for all

Lindiwe Mazibuko v. City
of Johannesburg

2009

South Africa

Rights to water and sanitation

Finds no immediate duty to provide a specific amount of water but only reasonable measures within the country’s
resources

Caceres Corrales v. Colombia

2010

Colombia

Rights to life and heath

Upholds a complete ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship

Canada (Attorney General) v.
PHS Community Services
Society

2011

Canada

Right to liberty and security of person, right to life

Finds unconstitutional the failure to exempt
drug users and staff at a supervised
safe-injection site from bans on possession of and trafficking in illicit drugs

Matsipane Mosetlhanyane et
al. v. The Attorney General

2011

Botswana

Freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;
right to water and sanitation

Protects water rights of an indigenous
community living in the Kalahari
desert

5000 Citizens v. Article 3 of Law
No. 28705

2011

Peru

Right to health

Upholds a ban on smoking in all public
places

British American Tobacco
South Africa v. Minister of
Health

2012

South Africa

Novartis AG v. Union of India

2013

India

Freedom from discrimination; rights Requires government to cover treatment
to health, security, life, and the
expenses for persons living with HIV
benefits of scientific progress
and to develop information campaigns

Rights to bodily integrity, health,
and life

Freedom of expression; rights to
information, a clean environment, and health
Rights to health and life

Mandates universal, free treatment for
persons living with HIV

Upholds the constitutionality of restrictions on tobacco advertising and
marketing
Invalidates the patent for Gleevec because
it was not materially better than the
existing drug

obligations.39 The same failure to mobilize resources has plagued WHO normative development in such areas as achieving ambitious goals
set forth in action plans on noncommunicable
diseases and mental health.40-42

tant global health tools. The more difficult question is whether to pursue hard or soft routes to
address health challenges. This debate plays out
in international forums ranging from alcohol control and biomedical research to broader reforms
such as the Framework Convention on Global
Health.30,43-45 However, there are strengths and
S t r ategy for Gl ob a l
weaknesses to both approaches.
He a lth L aws
Soft agreements are easier to negotiate, with
Given the undoubted need for global coopera- countries more likely to accede to far-reaching
tion, international norms are accepted as impor- norms if there is no formal obligation to comply.

1738
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Table 2. Limitations of Global Health Law.
Challenge

Description

Example

National sovereignty

Countries are reluctant to forgo self-governance or The Global Code of Practice on the International Re
cede authority to international actors.
cruitment of Health Personnel is voluntary, despite
active recruitment from high-income countries.

Rise of nongovernmental actors

Businesses, foundations, and civil-society groups
have major effects on health but are hard to
govern at the international level.

Divergent interests of emerging High-income countries defend trade liberalization
economies and high-income
(e.g., intellectual property), whereas low- and
countries
middle-income countries focus on health justice (e.g., access to medicines and fair allocation of scientific benefits).

The Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity, and
Health does not govern marketing of food.
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
struggled to reconcile Indonesia’s claim for fair
sharing of benefits with the desire of high-income
countries to receive viral samples.

Funding earmarked by private
Countries route assistance through the WHO and Approximately 80% of the WHO’s funding is volundonors for specific sectors,
other multilateral agencies but hold tight control
tary, with targets that are incongruent with the
diseases, or regions through
over its use, limiting WHO control of its resourcpriorities of the World Health Assembly and the
multilateral agencies (“multies and ability to set priorities and diminishing
major causes of disability and death.
bi” financing)
the perceived independence of the WHO.
Funding for capacity building

Global health law rarely requires high-income
countries to build capacities in lower-income
countries to fulfill international obligations.

A committee on functioning of the International
Health Regulations (2011) found that many
countries lacked capacity and could not fulfill
their obligations.

Compliance and incentives

WHO norms (whether soft or hard) rarely contain
effective methods for holding countries and
stakeholders accountable.

The Global Strategy to Reduce Harmful Use of Alcohol
does not require governmental action or prevent
industry from lobbying against alcohol control.

Adjudication and enforcement
of norms

The WHO lacks power to adjudicate most disputes The tobacco industry uses the World Trade Organi
and enforce norms.
zation and investment treaties to challenge plain
packaging of tobacco products and the initiation
of tobacco-control campaigns.

Countries can assent to a soft norm without the
national constitutional processes entailed in ratifying a treaty. In addition, soft norms can be
negotiated more quickly with the use of fewer
resources. Resolutions of the WHO Health Assembly represent a major expression of political
will and can lead to progressive deepening of
norms — enacted into domestic law, referenced
by treaty bodies, or incorporated into international law. The WHO, moreover, is building accountability mechanisms into soft agreements,
with targets, monitoring, and timelines for compliance.
However, national governments can largely
ignore soft instruments, and as a result, civil
society often urges treaty development.30 No hard
norms have been enacted, for example, relating
to food, alcohol, physical activity, injuries, pain
medication, or mental health. If the WHO acts
principally through voluntary agreements, while
other sectors develop hard law, this weakens and
sidelines the agency. Civil society often points to

n engl j med 370;18

the obligatory nature of international trade law
and its binding dispute-settlement mechanism,
which often trumps WHO norms.46
Even with all the funding and celebrity power
that has entered the global health space, key
health indicators lag, whereas the health gap
between rich and poor has barely abated.47,48
A renewed attention to lawmaking efforts by the
WHO and the human right to health are crucial
elements of progress. It is only through law that
individuals and populations can claim entitlements to health services and that corresponding governmental obligations can be established
and enforced. It is through law that norms can
be set, fragmented activities coordinated, and
good governance ensured, including stewardship, transparency, participation, and accountability. Global health law, despite its limitations,
remains vital to achieving global health with
justice.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with
the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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